



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
4 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Reconnaissance, CIA

SUBJECT: NRO Management Documents



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1. As requested in your note of 25 October 1965, I have reviewed

 By way of general observation, I have confined my reaction to those portions of the document relating specifically to aircraft reconnaissance projects. It is my view that the document as proposed is essentially consistent with the provisions of the NRO Agreement executed on 11 August 1965. Hereinafter I will present my comments in the general order of content of the directive under consideration.

2. The NRP is rather elaborately described as being "national in character." However, as the paper is developed it becomes increasingly evident the NRP is made up of DOD (most particularly Department of the Air Force) and CIA. The apparent exclusion of US Navy participation is singularly obvious and probably unwarranted. It would appear that Dr. Flax will retain his responsibilities and functions as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development. I find it difficult to imagine Dr. Flax being able to perform in that job as well as fulfill his role as DNRO without doing serious injustice to both jobs. It would certainly seem likely that if he is expected to wear both hats, then he will find it necessary to engage a large and strong staff to assist him in his work as DNRO. This staff then becomes just one more layer between the operators and the decision making levels.



3. I believe the expression "overflights of so-called 'denied' territory" requires considerable clarification. I do not believe, as implied in paragraph 4. b., that the Secretary of Defense in his own right has the authority to determine when a specific mission or requirement falls within the category of "denied territory overflight" or "military operations."



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
4. I believe the whole topic of command relationships as they are described or delineated throughout the paper is subject to question. I do not understand how Program Directors, as stated in paragraph 6. b., can be "responsive directly and solely to the NRO for NRP matters" while at the same time, as indicated in paragraph 8. d., how Project Directors can be "responsible through his Program Director solely to the DNRO for the total conduct of his Project." In brief, if this document was intended to clarify intra-Agency and inter-agency management relationships, that objective is not accomplished.

5. Though not necessarily a significant observation, I do wonder why in paragraph 6. the DOD Aircraft Reconnaissance Programs Director "commands and/or controls units" whereas the CIA Reconnaissance Programs Director "supervises and/or controls elements." It would be my view that the CIA can command units as well as the DOD. I would suggest a change in the title "CIA Reconnaissance Programs Office" to CIA Aircraft and Space Reconnaissance Programs Office. In paragraph 7. c. I would substitute the phrase "reviewing plans to satisfy USIB requirements" rather than "reviewing plans for operational missions." Though the paper goes on to say Project Directors would establish specific mission flight plans, the earlier reference to reviewing plans would tend to leave the door open for unnecessary and undesirable participation by the NRO Staff in the conduct of operations.

6. Under the description of the NRO Comptroller's functions and responsibilities, I feel the extent to which he "monitors the budgeting and expenditure of significant NRP-support funds by other agencies" should be clearly spelled out in this or some subsequent management document.

7. In paragraph 7. f. I find the language used in sub-paragraphs dealing with DOD Aircraft Reconnaissance and CIA Reconnaissance somewhat confusing and in need of explanation. On the one hand, it is mentioned that General Geary will have responsibility for the "conduct of DNRO-approved in-house and contractor studies for future aircraft systems" whereas the Agency would have responsibility for the "conduct


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of an aircraft and space-oriented study, research and technology program." This inconsistent use of terminology may not be significant in that earlier sub-paragraphs in this same section (e., f., and g.), the expression "development, procurement and operations of assigned aircraft and space systems" is used consistently in each of the programs.

8. I would tend to question the DNRO being in a position to approve or disapprove participating agencies' selection of Project Directors and Deputy Directors. This should be the prerogative of the participating agency.

9. In paragraph 9., devoted to communications, I would insert "and appropriate" following the words "where available." The paragraph as proposed by the DDNRO would presume any and all Agency communications facilities would be available for support to the NRP. Obviously, this is not the case. Paragraph 9.c. should be considered wholly unacceptable. The NRO Staff cannot be placed in the role of dictating to the Agency, communications standards and procedures. As a matter of fact, the Agency's standards are generally greater and its procedures for the most part simpler than those followed in the typical military system. I would suggest that this paragraph be conditioned by inserting some statement which establishes the Agency as the final authority on standards and procedures which relate to CIA communications facilities.


10. In paragraph 9.d., though it is not explicit, I assume the reference to a restriction of the "NRP communications to higher authority" is confined to electronic communications. That being true, I would urge that the last sentence of this paragraph be amended to reflect the requirement for appropriate coordination with the DNRO rather than "prior and specific approval of the DNRO." Otherwise we will find the Agency very much restricted in our external liaison.



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JACK C. LEDFORD
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Special Activities


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